4. the Clinton Administration Approach

At the outset, the Clinton administration was in a quandary about whether to pursue a carrot or stick approach. The Embassy for long had sought to reorient policy so that the United States would give economic assistance to Ukraine and thus underline Washington's overall support. In addition, the Embassy had argued that the United States would have to play the role of divorce lawyer between Kiev and Moscow, something the Bush administration started to do on the HEU and nuclear issues including security assurances whether or not it wanted to. The Embassy argued the important role that Ukraine could play in the region and, therefore, that it was important to have a viable, independent Ukrainian state. The Clinton administration, having seen the frustration experienced by the previous administration and possibly wanting to pre-empt any chance of Kiev's squeezing out new concessions, preferred a policy of pressure against Ukraine. At its best, this policy envisioned positive inducements of tempting Kiev by stressing how quickly other states, such as Belarus, were receiving assistance in the wake of START ratification. The relationship, at first, appeared to get off to a good start with the President's lengthy January 26 phone conversation with Kravchuk. While President Clinton urged START and NPT action, he emphasized that the United States seeks a relationship that involves not only security, but economic and political issues as well and urged Kravchuk to work with the International Monetary Fund. In February, however, showing the overriding importance of the nuclear issue, Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote to Zlenko urging START ratification. He noted that Belarus had recently ratified the treaty and adhered to the NPT and that it was now Ukraine's turn to do likewise. And, at the April Vancouver summit, the United States and Russia agreed to use their separate influence on Ukraine to move Kiev toward de-nuclearization. During their March meeting in Washington, Secretary Christopher emphasized for Zlenko the importance of Ukraine's adhering to its nuclear commitments. Christopher emphasized the importance the United States attaches to good relations but that, while the United States wants to be helpful with credits and investments, the nuclear issue remained a cloud over the relationship. He stressed that failure to act on START and NPT could complicate relations and make it difficult to develop the kind of strong bilateral relations both countries would like. In a note of exasperation similar to that of the previous administration, the Secretary reminded Zlenko that during their January phone conversation, Zlenko had promised that the treaties would soon be taken up by the Rada. Two months later, the Secretary continued, nothing had moved and Zlenko was now even less encouraging. From his side, Zlenko put an emphasis on obtaining security assurances. In his meeting with President Clinton during that March visit, the President emphasized for Zlenko the importance of START. The President stated that START was a pre-condition for a successful relationship, a statement that was regarded by some Ukrainian deputies as a threat. The Ukrainian media, however, stressed the good status of United States-Ukrainian relations and did not focus on the differences over the nuclear issue. President Clinton's comment regarding START as a pre-condition for better relations was first reported in the Russian and not Ukrainian press. During this period, the administration was deeply concerned about reports that Ukraine was developing its own launch capability and was debating on how to approach Ukraine on this question. This concern, no doubt, added to the belief for the need to keep the pressure on Kiev. The President's message was re-emphasized by the Codel led by then House Majority leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO.) in early April, which carried a presidential letter explaining to Kravchuk that the furtherance of bilateral relations depended on Ukraine living up to its nuclear commitments. …