Will Army Aviation Be Invited to Play in the Next War

WHEN THE WAR in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the commander in chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCENT), called for Central Intelligence Agency operatives; Special Operations Forces soldiers; ground elements of the 10th Mountain Division; and the U.S. Marines with air support from the Special Forces, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force (USAF). It was not until January 2002 that Army aviation-in the form of the 101st Airborne Division--arrived with aviation units near Kandahar, Afghanistan. While this order of force commitment seems reasonable, given the special forces' deep operations training and expertise and the Marines' mission to be first over the beach, it is still surprising that the 101st Airborne Division was not in theater until 3 months after the joint operation had begun. After all, from a joint perspective, the 101st maintains a high training state, strategic mobility with relatively light deployment loads, theater mobility with its helicopter support and airborne delivery training, and deep operations capabilities. In fact, Army aviation as a whole offers much toward fulfilling the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010, in particular, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimension protection. As a maneuver force, attack and lift assets can move heavy-hitting munitions and assault-capable warriors around the battlefield as no other asset can. It can place firepower quickly on distributed targets and project fires at ranges that afford self-protection and protect supported ground forces. Lift helicopters can move ground forces to distant objectives quickly. Attack helicopters can put tremendous firepower precisely on distant targets or dominate a forward battle position-just as a holding force of many troops can do-and they can protect an advancing maneuver force, escort and protect an air assault force on ingress and egress, or perform sentinel duties over a resting brigade. Given what Army aviation has to offer, how can the Army ensure that Army aviation plays a key role in future joint operations? First, Army aviation must make itself more deployable. Second, it must make itself more survivable. And, finally, related to survivability, it must be part of the joint force air component commander's (JFACC's) air tasking order (ATO). Army Aviation Must Make Itself More Deployable When airlifter allocations are decided for joint operations, the worth of Army aviation assets in combat is weighed against what other military assets can offer in effectiveness and reliability. Thus, the ability to deploy quickly is critical. When asked to deploy, Army attack and support helicopters have self-deployment capabilities for the airframes themselves; however, they have no airborne refueling abilities, as some special forces helicopters have. As a result, attack helicopters must make stops every 750 nautical miles (1,200 for the future Comanche), not enough range for safe overseas deployments.1 If self-deployment is used, a helicopter battalion depends on a large contingent of support personnel and equipment during en route stops and in the battle area. That support force, in turn, needs C-17s and C-5s to reach a destination. An entire Apache battalion, including all its aircraft, requires airlift of at least 41 C-17s and 25 C-5s. Unfortunately, these airlifters must be shared with the whole Army and Air Force and some Navy and Marine forces. In fact, the Army's 10th Mountain Division was deployed to Uzbekistan in October 2001; however, it was asked to deploy only its light infantry and not its division aviation assets. Army aviation is clearly working on the problem. For example, significant effort is being made to reduce the 1,335 to 2,000 short tons that each Comanche battalion is projected to need on deployments.2 This figure should be reduced in planning for the 2008 appearance of a Comanche unit. However, other options are also worthy of consideration. …