2002Unpublished venueRequires access

Army Aviation for the Operational Commander: Can It Get to the Fight, and Can It Integrate into a Joint Air Operation

Thomas R. Drew

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Abstract

Today s Army aviation forces have the potential to provide a Joint Force Commander (JFC) or a War Fighting Commander in Chief (CINC) tremendous lethality and flexibility throughout the spectrum of conflict and operational functions. However, current doctrine for deploying and employing Army aviation forces prevents their inclusion in many Operational and Contingency plans. Therefore, new doctrine must be created to make aviation forces easier to deploy and employ. Innovative ways of overcoming strategic mobility limitations such as creating aviation prepositioned stocks, which only include the truck, tents, and other easy to maintain items to support an aviation task force, would cut the strategic air required to move an aviation task force in half. The creation of doctrine to allow Army aviation to be employed under the joint force air component commander (JFACC) would allow for the most effective and efficient use of Army aviation by an operational commander. Aviation doctrine has not changed significantly in over 25 years. Task Force Hawk s inability to rapidly assimilate into the joint air operation over Serbia and Kosovo during Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrates the need for change. Lessons learned during Operation Allied Force, which were written nearly three years ago, have yet to be incorporated into Army doctrine. The capabilities of the modern aviation fleet have out-grown the Air Land Battle doctrine of the 70s and 80s. The time for change is now.

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What this paper is about

Today s Army aviation forces have the potential to provide a Joint Force Commander (JFC) or a War Fighting Commander in Chief (CINC) tremendous lethality and flexibility throughout the spectrum of conflict and operational functions. However, current doctrine for deploying and employing Army aviation forces prevents their inclusion in many Operational and Contingency plans. Therefore, new doctrine must be created to make aviation forces easier to deploy and employ. Innovative ways of overcoming strategic mobility limitations such as creating aviation prepositioned stocks, which only include the truck, tents, and other easy to maintain items to support an aviation task force, would cut the strategic air required to move an aviation task force in half. The creation of doctrine to allow Army aviation to be employed under the joint force air component commander (JFACC) would allow for the most effective and efficient use of Army aviation by an operational commander. Aviation doctrine has not changed significantly in over 25 years. Task Force Hawk s inability to rapidly assimilate into the joint air operation over Serbia and Kosovo during Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrates the need for change. Lessons learned during Operation Allied Force, which were written nearly three years ago, have yet to be incorporated into Army doctrine. The capabilities of the modern aviation fleet have out-grown the Air Land Battle doctrine of the 70s and 80s. The time for change is now.

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Available abstract

Today s Army aviation forces have the potential to provide a Joint Force Commander (JFC) or a War Fighting Commander in Chief (CINC) tremendous lethality and flexibility throughout the spectrum of conflict and operational functions. However, current doctrine for deploying and employing Army aviation forces prevents their inclusion in many Operational and Contingency plans. Therefore, new doctrine must be created to make aviation forces easier to deploy and employ. Innovative ways of overcoming strategic mobility limitations such as creating aviation prepositioned stocks, which only include the truck, tents, and other easy to maintain items to support an aviation task force, would cut the strategic air required to move an aviation task force in half. The creation of doctrine to allow Army aviation to be employed under the joint force air component commander (JFACC) would allow for the most effective and efficient use of Army aviation by an operational commander. Aviation doctrine has not changed significantly in over 25 years. Task Force Hawk s inability to rapidly assimilate into the joint air operation over Serbia and Kosovo during Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrates the need for change. Lessons learned during Operation Allied Force, which were written nearly three years ago, have yet to be incorporated into Army doctrine. The capabilities of the modern aviation fleet have out-grown the Air Land Battle doctrine of the 70s and 80s. The time for change is now.

Key concepts: Aeronautics, Aviation, Joint (building), Operations research, Computer science, Engineering, Computer security, Aerospace engineering

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