Competition versus efficiency
Soumyananda Dinda, Arijit Mukherjee
Abstract
Open-access reader
Soumyananda Dinda, Arijit Mukherjee
Abstract
Open-access reader
It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits consumers and encourages the antitrust authorities to foster competition. We show that this view can be misleading, and higher competition may actually make the consumers worse-off. We suggest that the antitrust authorities should be interested in reducing inefficiency instead of increasing competition through more firms.
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It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits consumers and encourages the antitrust authorities to foster competition. We show that this view can be misleading, and higher competition may actually make the consumers worse-off. We suggest that the antitrust authorities should be interested in reducing inefficiency instead of increasing competition through more firms.
Key concepts: Inefficiency, Competition (biology), Business, Economics, Industrial organization, Competition policy, Microeconomics, Monopoly