1998SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment

Kenneth S. Corts

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Abstract

Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the tradeoff of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no-haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.

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Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the tradeoff of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no-haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.

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Available abstract

Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the tradeoff of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no-haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.

Key concepts: Monopolistic competition, Price discrimination, Economics, Oligopoly, Microeconomics, Welfare, Competition (biology), Imperfect competition

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