Objectivity and Truth
Lynn Holt
Abstract
Lynn Holt
Abstract
The hallmark of objectivity, according to Thomas Nagel, is detachment from perspective. Objectivity is, he says, a method of understanding which seeks to transcend the limitations of more subjective viewpoints. In fact, argues Nagel, objectivity is a matter of degree, with some perspectives being more objective than others by being more detached from individual perspectives. The cultivation of detachment as an ideal of objectivity is indeed so firmly rooted that it may appear simply to be the concept of objectivity. The adoption of the ancient ideal of objectivity requires a move away from what Putnam called criterial rationality, which in turn entails, among other things, the obliteration of any significant distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. The development of truth is twofold, involving the transformation of both potential knower and potential known. When Aristotle says that the intellectual virtues grasp the truth, the use of &s;truth&s; is a metonym.
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The hallmark of objectivity, according to Thomas Nagel, is detachment from perspective. Objectivity is, he says, a method of understanding which seeks to transcend the limitations of more subjective viewpoints. In fact, argues Nagel, objectivity is a matter of degree, with some perspectives being more objective than others by being more detached from individual perspectives. The cultivation of detachment as an ideal of objectivity is indeed so firmly rooted that it may appear simply to be the concept of objectivity. The adoption of the ancient ideal of objectivity requires a move away from what Putnam called criterial rationality, which in turn entails, among other things, the obliteration of any significant distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. The development of truth is twofold, involving the transformation of both potential knower and potential known. When Aristotle says that the intellectual virtues grasp the truth, the use of &s;truth&s; is a metonym.
Key concepts: Objectivity (philosophy), Philosophy, Epistemology