Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism
Aleksandar Dobrijević
Abstract
Open-access reader
Aleksandar Dobrijević
Abstract
Open-access reader
?Reasons fundamentalists? argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. ?Ought fundamentalists? claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of ?ought? is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
?Reasons fundamentalists? argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. ?Ought fundamentalists? claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of ?ought? is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.
Key concepts: Skepticism, Normative, Fundamentalism, Foundation (evidence), Epistemology, Philosophy, Domain (mathematical analysis), Political science