2018•Unpublished venueRequires access

Two-Pursuer, One-Evader Pursuit Evasion Differential Game

Zachariah E. Fuchs, Eloy García, David W. Casbeer

Open publisher page 16 citations

Abstract

We analyze a two-team differential game in which a single evader strives to maximize time to capture against a two-pursuer team. The global equilibrium solution of the differential game divides the admissible state space into regions of qualitatively different behavior. Each of these regions exhibit varying levels of cooperation between the two pursuers. Similarly, the evader's equilibrium strategy exhibits varying levels of evasion from each of the pursuers depending which region the state lies within. Therefore, this game and the corresponding analysis provides a simple, yet structurally rich, illustration of when cooperation is beneficial and meaningful for multi-agent teams.

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What this paper is about

We analyze a two-team differential game in which a single evader strives to maximize time to capture against a two-pursuer team. The global equilibrium solution of the differential game divides the admissible state space into regions of qualitatively different behavior. Each of these regions exhibit varying levels of cooperation between the two pursuers. Similarly, the evader's equilibrium strategy exhibits varying levels of evasion from each of the pursuers depending which region the state lies within. Therefore, this game and the corresponding analysis provides a simple, yet structurally rich, illustration of when cooperation is beneficial and meaningful for multi-agent teams.

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OpenAlex reports 16 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

We analyze a two-team differential game in which a single evader strives to maximize time to capture against a two-pursuer team. The global equilibrium solution of the differential game divides the admissible state space into regions of qualitatively different behavior. Each of these regions exhibit varying levels of cooperation between the two pursuers. Similarly, the evader's equilibrium strategy exhibits varying levels of evasion from each of the pursuers depending which region the state lies within. Therefore, this game and the corresponding analysis provides a simple, yet structurally rich, illustration of when cooperation is beneficial and meaningful for multi-agent teams.

Key concepts: Pursuer, Pursuit-evasion, Differential game, Differential (mechanical device), Evasion (ethics), Computer science, Nash equilibrium, Mathematical optimization

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