Evolution of Army Attack Aviation: A Chaotic Coupled Pendulums Analogy

United States Army corps and division commanders pursued varied approaches to integrate Army attack aviation into their schemes of maneuver over the past thirty years. Two predominant schools of thought emerged: close combat attack or deep attacks. After focusing on deep attacks during the 1980s and 1990s, the attack aviation community drastically "about faced" towards supporting ground maneuver units in the close fight in mid-2003. Since that time, Army attack units dedicated training to improving air-ground integration, reconnaissance and security operations, and providing close combat attacks in support of ground maneuver units. This monograph analyzes the development and employment of attack aviation over the past three decades through the analogy of chaotic coupled pendulums to explore the influence of corps, divisions, ground maneuver brigades, and the Army Aviation branch upon aviation brigades. Coupled pendulums consist of a series of steel balls suspended from an overhead wire and capable of swinging laterally without touching the adjacent balls. Each of these steel balls, acting like a simple pendulum, relates to an aviation brigade. The overhead connecting rod, representative of the Army Aviation branch, couples the individual pendulums by transferring the vibrations of the numerous oscillating pendulums. This coupling produces periods of synchronization, slight synchronization, and anti-synchronization with transitions in-between. Corps, division, and maneuver brigade commanders, acting like magnets, pull their supporting aviation brigade pendulum either towards the deep attack spectrum or close combat. Analyzing the evolution of attack aviation in light of multiple influential actors reflected in the chaotic coupled pendulum model evidences a more nuanced view of attack aviation. Corps significantly influenced attack aviation towards deep operations. Divisions, after overcoming hindrances to integrating attack aviation embraced a deep focus for their attack units. Operation Allied Force in 1999 caused many corps and division commanders to rethink this focus; they gradually shifted their attack helicopter units to supporting close operations while exploring means to strike deep. Army force structure changes and sustained stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 stripped corps and divisions of their influence over attack aviation resting power with ground maneuver brigades, who focused attack aviation on supporting close operations. As the Army transitions out of sustained stability and counterinsurgency operations, the Army Aviation community should embrace the opportunity to explore methods for attack aviation to execute deep operations in support of corps and division operations while retaining the proficiency in integrated air-ground close combat. Army attack aviation succeeded in Operation Desert Storm due to the experimentation during the late 1980s. Attack aviation units experienced in both deep attack and close combat operations adapted more rapidly and easier to combat conditions in Iraq than those units that focused solely on deep attack scenarios. As the Army explores means to execute Unified Land Operations in the coming decade, innovative applications of attack aviation, developed in training, will enable success in future conflicts.