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Targeting for Army Deep Attack

William L. Bond

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Abstract

Until recently, deep attack was the exclusive domain of the Air Force. But with the fielding of improved, longer range acquisition and attack systems, the Army has now gained the capability to kill targets in this area of the battlefield. The Army's new concept of 'Decide, Detect and Deliver' or targeting for Army Deep Attack worked well during Desert Storm and should be significantly enhanced by the addition of new systems. So well did this new procedure work that the Army should look carefully at supporting other service or joint programs in an effort to enhance the Army's Deep Attack Targeting (DAT) capability. Deep attack can be thought of as attacking those follow-on forces, second-echelon units and support, at depth, before they can concentrate their combat power on the front line (Close Attack). Depth, in regards to Deep Attack, is a function of time not distance. The CORPS is concerned with units that are more than a days road march from the front line. Deep Attack operations include the fires of artillery, rockets, missiles and air support (multi-service). Because of the limited range of Division assets, this mission is executed at the CORPS or higher levels. As an example, second-echelon tank units a day or more road march from the main battle area would be considered a suitable deep attack target. This paper will explore the procedures used to accomplish the DAT mission, the Army's successes and areas of future challenge.

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What this paper is about

Until recently, deep attack was the exclusive domain of the Air Force. But with the fielding of improved, longer range acquisition and attack systems, the Army has now gained the capability to kill targets in this area of the battlefield. The Army's new concept of 'Decide, Detect and Deliver' or targeting for Army Deep Attack worked well during Desert Storm and should be significantly enhanced by the addition of new systems. So well did this new procedure work that the Army should look carefully at supporting other service or joint programs in an effort to enhance the Army's Deep Attack Targeting (DAT) capability. Deep attack can be thought of as attacking those follow-on forces, second-echelon units and support, at depth, before they can concentrate their combat power on the front line (Close Attack). Depth, in regards to Deep Attack, is a function of time not distance. The CORPS is concerned with units that are more than a days road march from the front line. Deep Attack operations include the fires of artillery, rockets, missiles and air support (multi-service). Because of the limited range of Division assets, this mission is executed at the CORPS or higher levels. As an example, second-echelon tank units a day or more road march from the main battle area would be considered a suitable deep attack target. This paper will explore the procedures used to accomplish the DAT mission, the Army's successes and areas of future challenge.

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Available abstract

Until recently, deep attack was the exclusive domain of the Air Force. But with the fielding of improved, longer range acquisition and attack systems, the Army has now gained the capability to kill targets in this area of the battlefield. The Army's new concept of 'Decide, Detect and Deliver' or targeting for Army Deep Attack worked well during Desert Storm and should be significantly enhanced by the addition of new systems. So well did this new procedure work that the Army should look carefully at supporting other service or joint programs in an effort to enhance the Army's Deep Attack Targeting (DAT) capability. Deep attack can be thought of as attacking those follow-on forces, second-echelon units and support, at depth, before they can concentrate their combat power on the front line (Close Attack). Depth, in regards to Deep Attack, is a function of time not distance. The CORPS is concerned with units that are more than a days road march from the front line. Deep Attack operations include the fires of artillery, rockets, missiles and air support (multi-service). Because of the limited range of Division assets, this mission is executed at the CORPS or higher levels. As an example, second-echelon tank units a day or more road march from the main battle area would be considered a suitable deep attack target. This paper will explore the procedures used to accomplish the DAT mission, the Army's successes and areas of future challenge.

Key concepts: Computer security, Computer science

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