Operational battle command: lessons for the future.

Future thinking, decisive decision-making, and leadership provide the foundation for the analysis of battle command in theory, doctrine, and history. Classical and modern military theorists make the commander the central point for leadership and vision. The art of command, leadership, and generalship have long been subject to review and scrutiny. This has taken on additional emphasis with the publication of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in 1993. FM 100-5 presented a discussion of command and leadership which is the subject of numerous articles in professional journals and presentations by senior Army leaders. This monograph provides a foundation for the discussion of battle command by first reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of command. Next follows a discussion of service, Army, and joint doctrine along with a discourse on U.S. Army doctrine since World War II. The examination covers the concepts of command in both the 1941 and 1949 versions of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations. Finally, current doctrine is considered so that lessons can be drawn from the actions of successful operational commanders and applied to today's military. Two operational commanders are scrutinized to understand how they developed, stated, and exercised operational battle command. This examination covers General George S. Patton Jr. and General Matthew B. Ridgway. Each commander provides a mechanism to compare theory and doctrine to the actions of operational commanders exercising battle command, with a goal of anticipating battlefield events, while setting the conditions for success. Both of these leaders exercised battle command in joint/combined operations, the type of warfare expected to be the norm for future military operations. In addition, General Ridgway endured political constraints which were unusual for the early 1950s, but today are part of the new rules for warfare. Finally, each of these officers exercised battle command through a strong individual personality which contributed to their successful leadership. These lessons are extremely important today, given a perceived lack of institutional training on exercising battle command. This monograph concludes that operational assignments and self study will continue to provide the most useful means of training operational commanders. Further, that improvement is necessary at the War College level of instruction to address operational battle command. Without this educational component, the doctrinal aspect of battle command will wither and die.