Befehlstaktik and the Red Army Experience: Are There Lessons for Us?

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the tactical military command and control methods as practiced by the former Soviet Army and determine what, if any, lessons we can glean from the Red Army doctrinal experience. The monograph first examines the Prussian-German theoretical underpinnings of Auftragstaktik and the reasons for the adoption of the philosophy by the US Army. The monograph then examines the development of the Soviet tactical command and control philosophy from its origins through the post nuclear era. The monograph examines how the Soviets researched and designed a command and control methodology that specifically supported their particular environment. The monograph determines that the most senior military and political intellectuals worked in consonance to ensure a longevity that has survived technological innovations. The monograph concludes that, unlike the Red Army, the US Army has not integrated its doctrine with its practices. Training and actual combat operations continue to emphasize control rather than command. There is no centralized development of the doctrine nor is there consensus either among officers or the various branches on what mission-type orders are or how to implement them. The monograph recommends development of a joint doctrine that would facilitate uniformity of doctrine for all services. This doctrine would be disseminated to all service academies, service schools and institutes of higher military learning. Failing that, the Army would establish a TRADOC level board to codify the doctrinal philosophy. It would provide the requisite qualified people and resources to implement its developments. Lastly, the Army should overhaul its personnel rotation system so that commanders, subordinates and key staff would spend the time together necessary to develop the cohesive team envisioned.