Framing “the Public Interest”: Comparing Public Lobbying Campaigns in Four European States
Øyvind Ihlen, Ketil Raknes, Ian Somerville, Chiara Valentini, Charlotte Stachel, Irina Lock, Scott Davidson, Peter Seele
Abstract
Open-access reader
Øyvind Ihlen, Ketil Raknes, Ian Somerville, Chiara Valentini, Charlotte Stachel, Irina Lock, Scott Davidson, Peter Seele
Abstract
Open-access reader
How do lobbyists get their way and what is the consequence for democracy of their strategies? It is frequently asserted that lobbyists appeal to the public interest to strengthen their proposals. This paper empirically corroborates this claim through four case studies cutting across different European cultural clusters and political systems. The paper unpacks how businesses communicatively construct a link between their private interest and the public interest. The findings illustrate the flexibility of the public interest argument and hence also the potential problem. If everything can be made out to be in the public interest, the concept becomes empty and easy to capture for special interests. At the same time, unpacking the communicative construction helps in critically evaluating lobbyists’ claims of working in the public interest.
OpenAlex reports 42 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
How do lobbyists get their way and what is the consequence for democracy of their strategies? It is frequently asserted that lobbyists appeal to the public interest to strengthen their proposals. This paper empirically corroborates this claim through four case studies cutting across different European cultural clusters and political systems. The paper unpacks how businesses communicatively construct a link between their private interest and the public interest. The findings illustrate the flexibility of the public interest argument and hence also the potential problem. If everything can be made out to be in the public interest, the concept becomes empty and easy to capture for special interests. At the same time, unpacking the communicative construction helps in critically evaluating lobbyists’ claims of working in the public interest.
Key concepts: Public interest, Framing (construction), Unpacking, Appeal, Politics, Political science, Argument (complex analysis), Law and economics