2018•arXiv (Cornell University)Open access
The strategy-proofness of FIFA and UEFA tournament qualifiers
Łászló Csató
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Abstract
Tournament organisers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be better off by exerting a lower effort. It is shown that the European qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA World Cup are not strategy-proof in this sense: a team might be eliminated if it wins its last match in the group stage, while it advances to the next qualification round by playing a draw, provided that all other results remain the same. This scenario could have happened in October 2017, after four-fifths of all matches had already been played. A theoretical model is presented and nine incentive incompatible qualifiers to the recent FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships are identified. We suggest a fair mechanism in order to prevent manipulation in similar group-based qualification systems.