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Military Intervention to Stop Mass Atrocities

Pattrick Ladner

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Abstract

This monograph examines the 1994 Rwandan Genocide in an effort to determine whether or not military intervention by the United States would have prevented this catastrophe. This monograph investigates the circumstances that resulted in the international community's failure to intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and evaluates the strategic context for the lack of intervention in Rwanda through the military intervention criteria outlined in the 2001 ICISS Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report. This paper then reviews the strengths and weaknesses of varying military intervention options to determine whether these actions were feasible in Rwanda. The paper concludes that, although the United States had just cause to intervene to stop the Rwandan atrocities, it would not have been as effective as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was in ending the violence.

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What this paper is about

This monograph examines the 1994 Rwandan Genocide in an effort to determine whether or not military intervention by the United States would have prevented this catastrophe. This monograph investigates the circumstances that resulted in the international community's failure to intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and evaluates the strategic context for the lack of intervention in Rwanda through the military intervention criteria outlined in the 2001 ICISS Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report. This paper then reviews the strengths and weaknesses of varying military intervention options to determine whether these actions were feasible in Rwanda. The paper concludes that, although the United States had just cause to intervene to stop the Rwandan atrocities, it would not have been as effective as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was in ending the violence.

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Available abstract

This monograph examines the 1994 Rwandan Genocide in an effort to determine whether or not military intervention by the United States would have prevented this catastrophe. This monograph investigates the circumstances that resulted in the international community's failure to intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and evaluates the strategic context for the lack of intervention in Rwanda through the military intervention criteria outlined in the 2001 ICISS Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report. This paper then reviews the strengths and weaknesses of varying military intervention options to determine whether these actions were feasible in Rwanda. The paper concludes that, although the United States had just cause to intervene to stop the Rwandan atrocities, it would not have been as effective as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was in ending the violence.

Key concepts: Genocide, Intervention (counseling), Political science, Context (archaeology), Responsibility to protect, International community, Criminology, Strengths and weaknesses

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