The fiduciary structure of investment management regulation
Arthur B. Laby
Abstract
Arthur B. Laby
Abstract
The chapter examines the fiduciary structure of investment management regulation. Specifically, it addresses the relationship between investment managers’ fiduciary obligations and regulators’ efforts to control the investment management industry through rules and enforcement actions that constitute the bulk of fund law. Laby argues that much of that body of law is a response by regulators to the uncertainties inherent in the fiduciary obligation. On a broad series of issues, it is contended, regulators attempt to specify the precise fiduciary obligations of managers as they exercise their duties to clients.
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The chapter examines the fiduciary structure of investment management regulation. Specifically, it addresses the relationship between investment managers’ fiduciary obligations and regulators’ efforts to control the investment management industry through rules and enforcement actions that constitute the bulk of fund law. Laby argues that much of that body of law is a response by regulators to the uncertainties inherent in the fiduciary obligation. On a broad series of issues, it is contended, regulators attempt to specify the precise fiduciary obligations of managers as they exercise their duties to clients.
Key concepts: Fiduciary, Obligation, Enforcement, Business, Investment (military), Investment management, Accounting, Law and economics