1995Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library (US Army Combined Arms Center)Requires access

Joint task force design in operations other than war.

George Geczy

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Abstract

In 1989 and 1991 the US Army dramatically proved that it had learned from its failure in Vietnam. Just as FM 100-5 Operations represented a fundamental shift in Army's approach to warfare, so too Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm offered clear examples of the effects of this learning experience. In addition, these operations benchmark the nation's capability to achieve national policy objectives in a less constrained world stage. In this author's view, these victories mark a new era of learning in the military community. In other words, the OOTW learning experience for the Post Cold War military compares with the Vietnam Era for the Post World War II warrior. For a generation of soldiers, OOTW represents a different enemy in an unstable political environment. Although political events will shape this emerging battlefield, it also demands that the military adopt an intellectual framework that is not force destruction based. In fact, this new enemy, which ranges from a disaster to a criminal organization, cannot be defeated by applying traditional combat power. Despite this altered mental image of the battlefield, the dangers inherent in misjudging it are the same, namely mission failure. The military's ability to do OOTW missions is already shaping its relevance for the 21st Century. As the United States attempts to remain engaged in the world and enlarge its democratic spectrum, doing these missions well is important to national policy. The organization of choice for the modern military to cope in this environment is the Joint Task Force (JTF).

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What this paper is about

In 1989 and 1991 the US Army dramatically proved that it had learned from its failure in Vietnam. Just as FM 100-5 Operations represented a fundamental shift in Army's approach to warfare, so too Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm offered clear examples of the effects of this learning experience. In addition, these operations benchmark the nation's capability to achieve national policy objectives in a less constrained world stage. In this author's view, these victories mark a new era of learning in the military community. In other words, the OOTW learning experience for the Post Cold War military compares with the Vietnam Era for the Post World War II warrior. For a generation of soldiers, OOTW represents a different enemy in an unstable political environment. Although political events will shape this emerging battlefield, it also demands that the military adopt an intellectual framework that is not force destruction based. In fact, this new enemy, which ranges from a disaster to a criminal organization, cannot be defeated by applying traditional combat power. Despite this altered mental image of the battlefield, the dangers inherent in misjudging it are the same, namely mission failure. The military's ability to do OOTW missions is already shaping its relevance for the 21st Century. As the United States attempts to remain engaged in the world and enlarge its democratic spectrum, doing these missions well is important to national policy. The organization of choice for the modern military to cope in this environment is the Joint Task Force (JTF).

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Available abstract

In 1989 and 1991 the US Army dramatically proved that it had learned from its failure in Vietnam. Just as FM 100-5 Operations represented a fundamental shift in Army's approach to warfare, so too Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm offered clear examples of the effects of this learning experience. In addition, these operations benchmark the nation's capability to achieve national policy objectives in a less constrained world stage. In this author's view, these victories mark a new era of learning in the military community. In other words, the OOTW learning experience for the Post Cold War military compares with the Vietnam Era for the Post World War II warrior. For a generation of soldiers, OOTW represents a different enemy in an unstable political environment. Although political events will shape this emerging battlefield, it also demands that the military adopt an intellectual framework that is not force destruction based. In fact, this new enemy, which ranges from a disaster to a criminal organization, cannot be defeated by applying traditional combat power. Despite this altered mental image of the battlefield, the dangers inherent in misjudging it are the same, namely mission failure. The military's ability to do OOTW missions is already shaping its relevance for the 21st Century. As the United States attempts to remain engaged in the world and enlarge its democratic spectrum, doing these missions well is important to national policy. The organization of choice for the modern military to cope in this environment is the Joint Task Force (JTF).

Key concepts: Adversary, Revolution in Military Affairs, Military science, Politics, Military threat, Military operations other than war, National security, Operational level of war

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