Small view of war: toward a broader FM 100-5.

The nation's security needs have dramatically changed since 1989. While the Army may, and probably will, fight a conventionally armed enemy in the future, it must also prepare itself to operate across a broad range of missions for which it is ill-prepared. The new security environment, with no colossal adversary but with a multitude of missions, placed the U.S. Army in a tenuous position with respect to its doctrine. What may become the most likely Army operation in the 1998 to 2003 period is the form of conflict variously known as small wars, unconventional war, low-intensity conflict or operations other than war (OOTW). These missions are equally as difficult to execute as war and require a trained, disciplined Army backed by a substantial doctrine. Clearly, the U.S. political leadership expects the military to play an increasing role in these operations. Additionally, a wide range of authors and studies point to this type of conflict as the most likely one requiring U.S. involvement, but it is precisely this area for which current Army operations doctrine is least prepared to meet. Specifically, the question under consideration is an assessment of the adequacy of the Army's FM 100-S, Operations in responding to this range of missions. Current operational doctrine focuses on the most dangerous to the detriment of the most likely. Doctrine should provide the analytical framework for examining, framing, and operating in diverse environments in which U.S. forces are neither at war nor are they conducting peacetime training. The question faced by the Army is whether to develop, as has been the pattern in the recent past, a doctrinal model which focuses on the most dangerous enemy or whether to adopt a broader doctrine which is relevant and accounts for the most dangerous threats as well as the most likely. Doctrine, and by extension the Army, faces a danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant if it does not address the operations which it conducts on a daily basis. Preparing for the once-in-a-generation war may lead to an army which can fight and win the nation's wars, but it can also lead to a disconnect between the strategy of the nation and the capabilities of the nation's instruments.