The Janus Paradox: The Army's Preparation for Conflicts of the 21st Century
Wayne M. Hall
Abstract
Wayne M. Hall
Abstract
This paper poses a serious question about the Army's future. Has the Army sufficiently thought through the environments the newly devised Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and its more futuristic Objective Force will face in the future? The conclusion: The Army's thinkers have done a great job in thinking through traditional combat-after all, open, force-on-force, symmetrical combat is precisely what the Army has done magnificently over the years. But the Army hasn't given sufficient thought to possible environmental variables it will cope with during future operations. If the Army doesn't reorient its current thinking, it could face serious shortfalls in doctrine, training, logistics, materiel, organizations and soldier systems. This paper is in three parts. First, it provides some broad concepts to support its position on what the Army will face in future conflicts. Included in this part is the premise that the Army's opponents of the future will successfully compete with the United States military regardless of their conventional military prowess. It also makes an argument that the Army must prepare for kinetic, force-on-force conflict, along with facing foes who use asymmetric strategies and engage in a combination of kinetic combat and invisible, digital struggles. Second, the paper provides some concrete observations about conceptual work the Army's planners have done with the Interim Brigade Combat Team. Third, the paper provides some specific C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) recommendations for the Army's leaders to consider, as they move the organization into a future whose complexities are difficult to grapple with and perceive.
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This paper poses a serious question about the Army's future. Has the Army sufficiently thought through the environments the newly devised Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and its more futuristic Objective Force will face in the future? The conclusion: The Army's thinkers have done a great job in thinking through traditional combat-after all, open, force-on-force, symmetrical combat is precisely what the Army has done magnificently over the years. But the Army hasn't given sufficient thought to possible environmental variables it will cope with during future operations. If the Army doesn't reorient its current thinking, it could face serious shortfalls in doctrine, training, logistics, materiel, organizations and soldier systems. This paper is in three parts. First, it provides some broad concepts to support its position on what the Army will face in future conflicts. Included in this part is the premise that the Army's opponents of the future will successfully compete with the United States military regardless of their conventional military prowess. It also makes an argument that the Army must prepare for kinetic, force-on-force conflict, along with facing foes who use asymmetric strategies and engage in a combination of kinetic combat and invisible, digital struggles. Second, the paper provides some concrete observations about conceptual work the Army's planners have done with the Interim Brigade Combat Team. Third, the paper provides some specific C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) recommendations for the Army's leaders to consider, as they move the organization into a future whose complexities are difficult to grapple with and perceive.
Key concepts: Interim, Doctrine, Argument (complex analysis), Premise, Military doctrine, Operational level of war, Face (sociological concept), Military tactics