Operational level command -- who is in charge?

This monograph discusses how the establishment of command relationships at the operational level of war impacts on sound operational design and execution. It uses the 1940 French campaign and the Allied campaign of 1944 in Burma as case studies of the applicability of traditional military theory to present-day operational command. The monograph first reviews theoretical concepts concerning the phenomena of command itself, and further, how it relates to the ability of a military force to generate combat power. It then analyzes the campaigns of 1940 and 1944 to gain insights concerning both ineffective and effective command structures for warfighting at the operational level. Next it looks at the implications for U.S. operational commanders in regard to their ability to plan and execute war at the operational level given present command relationships. The monograph questions whether there is a direct link between the establishment of command relationships and the resulting operational success or failure of a campaign; do command relationships established in peacetime, and their modification during the course of conflict, set preconditions for success or failure. Insights provided by historical example do not point to a clear answer, but they do suggest factors which top civilian and military leaders should consider when establishing command relationships at the operational level of war.