The Semantics of Objectivity in Hegel’s Science of Logic

The notion of objectivity in the Hegelian conceptual constellation is one that, if not ambiguous, is at least characterized by a strong polysemy. This paper considers the significance that “objectivity” assumes for Hegel in relation to logic; it therefore also raises questions about the kind of objectivity Hegel attributes to logical thought. The thesis defended is that one can understand the Hegelian notion of objectivity only if one recognizes the inextricable bond between the epistemological and the ontological in Hegel’s philosophy, or rather, only if one acknowledges the radical critique Hegel directs at the modern gap between epistemological and ontological dimensions. It is shown that the Hegelian notion of objectivity should be understood neither in traditionally epistemological terms (as a notion belonging to some theory of knowledge or epistemology) nor in purely ontological terms (as a property exclusive to being, facts, or the states of things).