Does Receiving a Breach Penalty from Centrelink Coerce Unemployed People to Comply with the Government's Wishes?
Simon Schooneveldt, John R. Tomlinson
Abstract
Simon Schooneveldt, John R. Tomlinson
Abstract
In the past three years, the number of breach penalties applied by Centrelink to welfare recipients have more than trebled, with some 349,000 incidences initially reported for the 2000-2001 year. Based on research undertaken for a Masters Degree in Social Science, this paper examines the reported lived experience of a sample of individuals who have been breached by Centrelink in the Brisbane area. The paper discusses whether those experiences accord with the stated policy expectation and intent of the Howard Coalition Government. Over its three terms, this Government has increasingly sought to introduce policies that increase surveillance, obligations and breach penalties that can be brought to bear on unemployed people. More recently other welfare recipients, including Disability Support Pensioners and Sole Parents are to be included in this process. This paper compares the Government’s stated intentions for its ‘Mutual Obligation ’ policies with the lived experience of a sample of 56
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In the past three years, the number of breach penalties applied by Centrelink to welfare recipients have more than trebled, with some 349,000 incidences initially reported for the 2000-2001 year. Based on research undertaken for a Masters Degree in Social Science, this paper examines the reported lived experience of a sample of individuals who have been breached by Centrelink in the Brisbane area. The paper discusses whether those experiences accord with the stated policy expectation and intent of the Howard Coalition Government. Over its three terms, this Government has increasingly sought to introduce policies that increase surveillance, obligations and breach penalties that can be brought to bear on unemployed people. More recently other welfare recipients, including Disability Support Pensioners and Sole Parents are to be included in this process. This paper compares the Government’s stated intentions for its ‘Mutual Obligation ’ policies with the lived experience of a sample of 56
Key concepts: Government (linguistics), Welfare, Sample (material), Obligation, Unemployment, Social policy, Public relations, Political science