2004•Australian Journal of Social IssuesOpen access

Do Mutual Obligation Breach Penalties Coerce Compliance with Government Expectations?

Simon Schooneveldt

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Abstract

A Brisbane survey was conducted to examine some of the consequences of Centrelink breach penalties when applied to unemployment welfare recipients under the Howard Coalition Government's ideology of Mutual Obligation. Fifty‐six such recipients responded to the author's survey by completing a questionnaire about their experiences after receiving one or more breach penalties. The consequences of being breached for those respondents are contrasted with the Coalition Government's stated expectations for its Mutual Obligation driven breach penalty system. The background to the rise of Mutual Obligation as an ideology and the elevated incidence of breach penalties are briefly discussed, along with the report of the survey findings. Interestingly, two surprise findings are given specific focus as they offer new insight.

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A Brisbane survey was conducted to examine some of the consequences of Centrelink breach penalties when applied to unemployment welfare recipients under the Howard Coalition Government's ideology of Mutual Obligation. Fifty‐six such recipients responded to the author's survey by completing a questionnaire about their experiences after receiving one or more breach penalties. The consequences of being breached for those respondents are contrasted with the Coalition Government's stated expectations for its Mutual Obligation driven breach penalty system. The background to the rise of Mutual Obligation as an ideology and the elevated incidence of breach penalties are briefly discussed, along with the report of the survey findings. Interestingly, two surprise findings are given specific focus as they offer new insight.

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Available abstract

A Brisbane survey was conducted to examine some of the consequences of Centrelink breach penalties when applied to unemployment welfare recipients under the Howard Coalition Government's ideology of Mutual Obligation. Fifty‐six such recipients responded to the author's survey by completing a questionnaire about their experiences after receiving one or more breach penalties. The consequences of being breached for those respondents are contrasted with the Coalition Government's stated expectations for its Mutual Obligation driven breach penalty system. The background to the rise of Mutual Obligation as an ideology and the elevated incidence of breach penalties are briefly discussed, along with the report of the survey findings. Interestingly, two surprise findings are given specific focus as they offer new insight.

Key concepts: Obligation, Ideology, Government (linguistics), Compliance (psychology), Surprise, Breach of contract, Law, Welfare

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