Were the Ancient Greeks Epistemic Democrats

Epistemic defences of democracy are increasingly popular. These defences are typically advanced on philosophical grounds, but the ancient Greeks are said to provide historical support. This article challenges that claim. It argues, first, that there is no evidence to suggest that the ancient Greeks stressed the role of knowledge in decision-making, the crux of the epistemic view. Next, it examines the distinction between knowledge (epistēmē), understood as information that exists independently of our will, and judgment (gnomē or krisis), understood as a view produced by and inextricably linked to particular willing agents, and shows that the ancient Greeks consistently conceived of political decision-making in terms of the latter rather than the former. Finally, taking Athens’ relations with the Melians and the rise of Macedonia as examples of significant political problems, it suggests that the ancient Greek view shows a better grasp of the inherently creative character of political action.