Intelligence Transformation: Using Threat Characteristics to Define Division Capabilities
Frank A. Smith
Abstract
Frank A. Smith
Abstract
The Army's fielding of military intelligence companies to the modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) as part of the Army Transformation has created a loss of intelligence capability for the modular division commander. This monograph explores the intelligence requirements of a modular division conducting operations in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). It assesses the nature of the emerging security environment by comparing the U.S. Government's strategic and operational threat models with the characteristics of evidentiary threats in the current environment. It poses the following question: Does the intelligence system of a modular division have the capability to provide a focused and detailed understanding of a networked irregular threat? The results of this analysis provide three observations. First, the theoretical threat model the Army is using in its capabilities-based approach to force design may be based on a false premise. Second, the capabilities-based approach to force design may be insufficient for developing an intelligence organization, because intelligence operations are inherently threat-specific. Third, the Army must use a mix of matrix, multi-divisional, and functional organizational structures across the intelligence enterprise to provide a capability that is both flexible and knowledgeable. The diffusion of threats across the globe requires the Army to develop a globally deployable force supported by an intelligence capability with problem-specific knowledge. Success with new organizational concepts in the GWOT suggests that commanders must tailor the specialties required to counter the threat to their specific tactical problem. Organizational structure changes within the division and the use of matrix organizations can provide the flexibility the Army needs to tailor its divisional intelligence capability to the characteristics of specific threats
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The Army's fielding of military intelligence companies to the modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) as part of the Army Transformation has created a loss of intelligence capability for the modular division commander. This monograph explores the intelligence requirements of a modular division conducting operations in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). It assesses the nature of the emerging security environment by comparing the U.S. Government's strategic and operational threat models with the characteristics of evidentiary threats in the current environment. It poses the following question: Does the intelligence system of a modular division have the capability to provide a focused and detailed understanding of a networked irregular threat? The results of this analysis provide three observations. First, the theoretical threat model the Army is using in its capabilities-based approach to force design may be based on a false premise. Second, the capabilities-based approach to force design may be insufficient for developing an intelligence organization, because intelligence operations are inherently threat-specific. Third, the Army must use a mix of matrix, multi-divisional, and functional organizational structures across the intelligence enterprise to provide a capability that is both flexible and knowledgeable. The diffusion of threats across the globe requires the Army to develop a globally deployable force supported by an intelligence capability with problem-specific knowledge. Success with new organizational concepts in the GWOT suggests that commanders must tailor the specialties required to counter the threat to their specific tactical problem. Organizational structure changes within the division and the use of matrix organizations can provide the flexibility the Army needs to tailor its divisional intelligence capability to the characteristics of specific threats
Key concepts: Modular design, Intelligence analysis, Premise, Military intelligence, Military doctrine, Engineering, Computer security, Division (mathematics)