2008•Corporate Ownership and ControlOpen access

Control and risk of CEO compensation.

María Dolores Álvarez‐Pérez, Edelmira Neira Fontela, Carmen Castro Casal

Abstract

This study analyses the influence of various characteristics of the Board of Directors on the control and risk of the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). It also examines the effect on these variables of some of the CEO personal characteristics and of various contingencies of the firm. The results reveal that control of the CEO compensation is determined fundamentally by the CEO participation in the capital of the firm, while the level of risk of the CEO compensation package is higher when the firm is diversified and implements a proactive competitive strategy.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Executive compensation, Chief executive officer, Business, Compensation (psychology), Control (management), Accounting, Industrial organization, Corporate governance