2016Unpublished venueRequires access

Reverse Engineering of DRAMs

Matthias Jung, Carl Christian Rheinländer, Christian Weis, Norbert Wehn

Open publisher page 33 citations

Abstract

In this paper we present a technique that reconstructs the physical location of memory cells in a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) without opening the device package and microscoping the device. Our method consists of an retention error analysis while a temperature gradient is applied to the DRAM device. This enables the extraction of the exact neighborhood relation of each single DRAM cell, which can be used to accomplish Row Hammer attacks in a very targeted way. However, this information can also be used to enhance current DRAM retention error models.

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What this paper is about

In this paper we present a technique that reconstructs the physical location of memory cells in a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) without opening the device package and microscoping the device. Our method consists of an retention error analysis while a temperature gradient is applied to the DRAM device. This enables the extraction of the exact neighborhood relation of each single DRAM cell, which can be used to accomplish Row Hammer attacks in a very targeted way. However, this information can also be used to enhance current DRAM retention error models.

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OpenAlex reports 33 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

In this paper we present a technique that reconstructs the physical location of memory cells in a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) without opening the device package and microscoping the device. Our method consists of an retention error analysis while a temperature gradient is applied to the DRAM device. This enables the extraction of the exact neighborhood relation of each single DRAM cell, which can be used to accomplish Row Hammer attacks in a very targeted way. However, this information can also be used to enhance current DRAM retention error models.

Key concepts: Dram, Dynamic random-access memory, Computer science, Random access memory, Universal memory, Data retention, Computer hardware, Memory cell

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