The Experience of the Japanese-Chinese War and of the Spanish Civil War for the Development of the German Blitzkrieg Doctrine and its Lessons for the Transformation Process

This monograph examines the transformation of military forces, the development of military doctrine and the influence of previous wars. It is an attempt to identify the driving factors of military transformation in general, to look into the role minor wars are playing in this process and to see whether there are constants of warfare, which are valid over a longer period of time within an otherwise rapidly changing environment. The thesis of the paper is that major wars determine the general direction of military change and minor military clashes are used to validate the direction.\nThe role of military history in general is described and a theoretical model for military transformation based on organizational respective institutional theory and the balance-of-power- theory is developed. The monograph explains the factors influencing military transformation and its relationship to previous wars. In this context the relations between doctrine, concept, and strategy are laid down and the role of doctrine in the planning process -force planning and operations planning -is examined.\nThe theoretical model and its explanations is then examined and evaluated at the example of the German "Blitzkrieg doctrine" (lightning war) and its development in the interwar era. The "Blitzkrieg doctrine" has been chosen because it is said to constitute a nearly perfect transformation of military forces. The influence of the Civil War in Spain and the Japanese war in China on the development and modification of this doctrine between 1935 and 1939 is of special interest, because such "minor military clashes" are often said to be used as a medium to shape the military means. The principles of the "Blitzkrieg docbine" are identified; the factors, which influenced the doctrine and the overall environment in which it emerged, are described.\nIn this context five factors of general validity for warfare are identified. The principles of concentration of forces at the decisive point, maneuver and mobility of forces, flexibility, leadership and initiative, and orchestration and coordination of the various forces found their origin in Prussian warfare during the Napoleonic era and were further developed in World War I. They provided the mental basis for the "Blitzkrieg doctrine," which cannot be called a doctrine fiom a formal point of view. These principles were neither contradicted by the Civil War in Spain nor by the Japanese Invasion in China in the Thirties of the last century. They seem to be valid even in the future under the conditions of network-centric warfare.\nTo understand the ongoing transformation process the interests of the political and military leaders are critical. Because the development of military doctrine is more an evolutionary than a revolutionary process, military change should follow the tradition of the institution. For the\nU.S. Army this means to further concentrate on technological advance and on individual training and leadership. Minor military clashes, if carefully evaluated and if the results were validated in war games and high level exercises, they may serve as a milestone to check the direction of the transformation process.