Two Moot Issues in Mill’s Utilitarianism

In the present paper I shall be concerned with two points at which I believe Mill’s Utilitarianism is frequently misinterpreted. The first, which is a relatively new issue, is whether Mill should be regarded as subscribing to a “rule-utilitarianism,” rather than to that unrestricted form of utilitarianism which is presently termed “act-utilitarianism. ” 1 The second is whether Mill’s proof of the hedonistic principle does in fact commit the elementary blunder which most critics, following G. E. Moore, have been ready to assume that it does. 2 In discussing each of these points I shall make more extensive use of Mill’s other writings than has been usual among commentators. As I have elsewhere sought to establish, it is a mistake to attempt to interpret Utilitarianism apart from a consideration of Mill’s less well known ethical writings, and especially apart from his psychological theory and his explicit rejection of Bentham’s psychology. 3 These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.