2010Cambridge University Press eBooksRequires access

Labour law and employee participation

Michael Lower

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

Introduction In the previous chapter we saw that British company law and corporate governance are inspired by the shareholder value principle. The corporation, technically distinct from its shareholders, is seen as existing principally to promote their interests. The board is required to take the advancement of shareholder interests as its principal decision-making criterion and is accountable to shareholders. Greater dialogue between the board and shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, is a major policy goal. The increasing sophistication of corporate governance mechanisms is clearly welcome to the extent that it truly leads to well-run businesses that meet the needs of their customers or clients at the same time as they promote the relevant interests of shareholders and employees. But where are the mechanisms that would allow employees both to play their part in promoting the well-being of the business and to protect their own reasonable interests? Serious engagement with the possibility of mandatory employee participation on the corporate board came to an end by the late 1970s. From then on, it has been taken for granted in the UK that company law and corporate governance belong to the shareholder. Employees, their interests and mechanisms for participation have been hived off into a separate labour law compartment. This chapter looks at the contributions made by labour law to the search for institutions that facilitate employee participation in governance.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Introduction In the previous chapter we saw that British company law and corporate governance are inspired by the shareholder value principle. The corporation, technically distinct from its shareholders, is seen as existing principally to promote their interests. The board is required to take the advancement of shareholder interests as its principal decision-making criterion and is accountable to shareholders. Greater dialogue between the board and shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, is a major policy goal. The increasing sophistication of corporate governance mechanisms is clearly welcome to the extent that it truly leads to well-run businesses that meet the needs of their customers or clients at the same time as they promote the relevant interests of shareholders and employees. But where are the mechanisms that would allow employees both to play their part in promoting the well-being of the business and to protect their own reasonable interests? Serious engagement with the possibility of mandatory employee participation on the corporate board came to an end by the late 1970s. From then on, it has been taken for granted in the UK that company law and corporate governance belong to the shareholder. Employees, their interests and mechanisms for participation have been hived off into a separate labour law compartment. This chapter looks at the contributions made by labour law to the search for institutions that facilitate employee participation in governance.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Introduction In the previous chapter we saw that British company law and corporate governance are inspired by the shareholder value principle. The corporation, technically distinct from its shareholders, is seen as existing principally to promote their interests. The board is required to take the advancement of shareholder interests as its principal decision-making criterion and is accountable to shareholders. Greater dialogue between the board and shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, is a major policy goal. The increasing sophistication of corporate governance mechanisms is clearly welcome to the extent that it truly leads to well-run businesses that meet the needs of their customers or clients at the same time as they promote the relevant interests of shareholders and employees. But where are the mechanisms that would allow employees both to play their part in promoting the well-being of the business and to protect their own reasonable interests? Serious engagement with the possibility of mandatory employee participation on the corporate board came to an end by the late 1970s. From then on, it has been taken for granted in the UK that company law and corporate governance belong to the shareholder. Employees, their interests and mechanisms for participation have been hived off into a separate labour law compartment. This chapter looks at the contributions made by labour law to the search for institutions that facilitate employee participation in governance.

Key concepts: Shareholder, Corporate governance, Corporation, Corporate law, Principal (computer security), Business, Accounting, Shareholder resolution

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Labour law and employee participation — Research Paper | ScholarLens