Jan Bengtsson
Abstract
Abstract This chapter introduces the arguments for why, according to the personalists, the absolute cannot be conceived in pantheistic and impersonalistic terms. It discusses the meaning of the new concept of God as a person, and explains the personalists’ insistence that the absolute can be understood as the personal God.
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Abstract This chapter introduces the arguments for why, according to the personalists, the absolute cannot be conceived in pantheistic and impersonalistic terms. It discusses the meaning of the new concept of God as a person, and explains the personalists’ insistence that the absolute can be understood as the personal God.
Key concepts: Absolute (philosophy), Meaning (existential), Epistemology, Philosophy