2009Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

Hume's Skepticism with Regard to Reason

Robert J. Fogelin

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

This chapter examines in detail Hume's most radical skeptical argument, one intended to show that reasoning, when allowed to pursue its own principles without restraint, will inevitably destroy all beliefs based upon reasoning. The key ideas in Hume's argument are, first, that reflections on the fallibility of our rational faculties will reduce all claims to demonstrative knowledge to questions of probability; second, that further reflections on human fallibility lower the level of probabilities themselves until, finally, through reiterating these diminutions, the level of confidence in our original knowledge will be reduced, as Hume puts it, to nothing. The chapter spells out this argument, evaluates it, and, though rejecting it, points out its centrality in Hume's reflections.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

This chapter examines in detail Hume's most radical skeptical argument, one intended to show that reasoning, when allowed to pursue its own principles without restraint, will inevitably destroy all beliefs based upon reasoning. The key ideas in Hume's argument are, first, that reflections on the fallibility of our rational faculties will reduce all claims to demonstrative knowledge to questions of probability; second, that further reflections on human fallibility lower the level of probabilities themselves until, finally, through reiterating these diminutions, the level of confidence in our original knowledge will be reduced, as Hume puts it, to nothing. The chapter spells out this argument, evaluates it, and, though rejecting it, points out its centrality in Hume's reflections.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

This chapter examines in detail Hume's most radical skeptical argument, one intended to show that reasoning, when allowed to pursue its own principles without restraint, will inevitably destroy all beliefs based upon reasoning. The key ideas in Hume's argument are, first, that reflections on the fallibility of our rational faculties will reduce all claims to demonstrative knowledge to questions of probability; second, that further reflections on human fallibility lower the level of probabilities themselves until, finally, through reiterating these diminutions, the level of confidence in our original knowledge will be reduced, as Hume puts it, to nothing. The chapter spells out this argument, evaluates it, and, though rejecting it, points out its centrality in Hume's reflections.

Key concepts: Skepticism, Philosophy, Epistemology, Positive economics, Economics

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Hume's Skepticism with Regard to Reason — Research Paper | ScholarLens