Drawing on Sartre’s Ontology to Interpret Kant’s Notion of Freedom

Kant and Sartre’s philosophies have both been characterized as centred upon strong notions of freedom. Both thinkers understand freedom as involving the capacity to have done otherwise. These thinkers’ metaphysical accounts of the possibility of freedom are, however, very distinct. While, in Being and Nothingness , Sartre dismisses any form of determinism out of hand, Kant attempts to reconcile transcendental freedom with causal determinism. As a result, many commentators have viewed Kant as attempting to carry out an impossible task. There are indeed important problems with Kant’s solution, and the first aim of this chapter is to focus upon ontological issues that arise from an attempt to make sense of Kant’s solution. A second aim will be to show how Sartre’s approach to ontology and the nature of consciousness can provide us with ways of addressing Kant’s problems. In so doing, I shall not be claiming that the proposed solution represents Kant’s views, but showing that it accords with a number of his claims. The chapter is structured as follows. After a sketch of Kant’s solution to the Third Antinomy, the cogency of the solution will be seen to rely upon a close link between theoretical and practical spontaneity which has echoes in Sartre. An ontological issue is, however, raised by this solution for which the Sartrean dichotomy of For-Itself and In-Itself 1 provides useful insights. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.