Theories of Rationality

In paper which opens this volume W. Spohn writes that modern theory of rationality has become large and rich. And the theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. The papers collected hereexplore various facets of rationality, focusing primarily on its normative status. The opening paper offers an overview of assessments of rationality. P. Engel writes about voluntariness which, for many, is intimately connected with normativity: normative extends only as far as voluntary does. Knowles and Pacherie address issue of norms within naturalistic view(s) of rationality. Knowles argues that naturalism needs no epistemic norms: insofar as one eschews purely a priori intuitions, there is no need for epistemic norms. Naturalized epistemology is not, and need not be, a theory of epistemic norms. Pacherie usefully discusses a whole range of possible views on issue. Papers by Verbeek, Cantwell and Gjelsvik point further in different directions. Verbeek discusses application of game-theoretical notion of rationality to issues of morality. Cantwell explores an intriguing generalization of Dutch book strategies, that is, a pragmatic view of rationality which conceptually ties irrationality to pragmatically sub-optimal behavior. Gjelsvik diagnoses two envelopes paradox, and argues that there is no paradox for expected utility theory as he understands it. The Editors thank Professor W. Rabinowicz of Lund University for his help and suggestions.