2015•Unpublished venueRequires access

Charter and Treaty, 1948–1949

Lawrence S. Kaplan

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Abstract

This chapter describes how postwar Europe entangled Vandenberg in conflicting emotions about the direction the United States should take. His diplomatic experiences confirmed the indispensable role of the UN in maintaining world peace. Simultaneously, he saw the UN’s leadership jeopardized by his own government and party as well as Soviet-led Communism. This chapter also argues that the Vandenberg Resolution was the landmark action that opened the way to the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, Vandenberg believed that the treaty was a deterrent to Soviet aggression without reference to its military implications. Eventually, he became frustrated, especially with the Military Assistance Program (MAP). By its nature, the MAP disturbed Vandenberg because of the possibility that NATO could, through the MAP, evolve into a military alliance threatening world peace and the UN’s integrity. Yet given the threat of Soviet-led Communism, he felt he had no choice but to accept the risk of perverting the Atlantic alliance. The consequence of this existential threat to the nation’s security ultimately trumped reliance on the supremacy of the UN Charter—repeatedly mentioned in the treaty—as the institution primarily responsible for international peace and security.

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This chapter describes how postwar Europe entangled Vandenberg in conflicting emotions about the direction the United States should take. His diplomatic experiences confirmed the indispensable role of the UN in maintaining world peace. Simultaneously, he saw the UN’s leadership jeopardized by his own government and party as well as Soviet-led Communism. This chapter also argues that the Vandenberg Resolution was the landmark action that opened the way to the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, Vandenberg believed that the treaty was a deterrent to Soviet aggression without reference to its military implications. Eventually, he became frustrated, especially with the Military Assistance Program (MAP). By its nature, the MAP disturbed Vandenberg because of the possibility that NATO could, through the MAP, evolve into a military alliance threatening world peace and the UN’s integrity. Yet given the threat of Soviet-led Communism, he felt he had no choice but to accept the risk of perverting the Atlantic alliance. The consequence of this existential threat to the nation’s security ultimately trumped reliance on the supremacy of the UN Charter—repeatedly mentioned in the treaty—as the institution primarily responsible for international peace and security.

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Available abstract

This chapter describes how postwar Europe entangled Vandenberg in conflicting emotions about the direction the United States should take. His diplomatic experiences confirmed the indispensable role of the UN in maintaining world peace. Simultaneously, he saw the UN’s leadership jeopardized by his own government and party as well as Soviet-led Communism. This chapter also argues that the Vandenberg Resolution was the landmark action that opened the way to the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, Vandenberg believed that the treaty was a deterrent to Soviet aggression without reference to its military implications. Eventually, he became frustrated, especially with the Military Assistance Program (MAP). By its nature, the MAP disturbed Vandenberg because of the possibility that NATO could, through the MAP, evolve into a military alliance threatening world peace and the UN’s integrity. Yet given the threat of Soviet-led Communism, he felt he had no choice but to accept the risk of perverting the Atlantic alliance. The consequence of this existential threat to the nation’s security ultimately trumped reliance on the supremacy of the UN Charter—repeatedly mentioned in the treaty—as the institution primarily responsible for international peace and security.

Key concepts: Charter, Treaty, Political science, Law, Law and economics, Sociology

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