Moral by Virtue of Virtue

Abstract Virtue ethics has resources that provide for attractive theories of right action and permissible action. The most promising approach is advocated by Rosalind Hursthouse: the morally right alternatives are those that the virtuous would characteristically take under the circumstances. This view has been criticized on a number of grounds. The objections include that the theory offers poor guidance, that the theory fails in cases of where people are in circumstances the virtuous would never be in, and that the theory fails in cases where someone confronts a tragic moral dilemma. The present work is an attempt to defend and extend Hursthouse's approach. Interpretations are offered of key conceptual ingredients in the theory, such as its explanatory aim, the 'circumstances' of the agent, and the 'characteristic' choices of the virtuous. It is argued that the resulting understanding of the theory makes it defensible against the objections. Further changes are proposed, including a shift of topic from right action to permissible action. A view of permissibility and other moral evaluations emerges that has considerable strength and no clear weakness.