Helen Steward
Abstract
This chapter argues for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. The real reason why determinism and moral responsibility are inconsistent is not moral, but metaphysical. The real reason is that determinism is inconsistent with agency, which is a necessary (though not, of course, a sufficient) condition of moral responsibility.
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This chapter argues for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. The real reason why determinism and moral responsibility are inconsistent is not moral, but metaphysical. The real reason is that determinism is inconsistent with agency, which is a necessary (though not, of course, a sufficient) condition of moral responsibility.
Key concepts: Determinism, Moral responsibility, Moral agency, Agency (philosophy), Incompatibilism, Free will, Metaphysics, Compatibilism