Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation (New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science)
Matthew Ratcliffe
Abstract
Matthew Ratcliffe
Abstract
This book offers arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves a folk or commonsense psychology, a view which Ratcliffe suggests is a theoretically motivated abstraction. His alternative account draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology, exploring patterned interactions in shared social situations.
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This book offers arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves a folk or commonsense psychology, a view which Ratcliffe suggests is a theoretically motivated abstraction. His alternative account draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology, exploring patterned interactions in shared social situations.
Key concepts: Folk psychology, Psychology, Cognitive science, Philosophy of psychology, Interpersonal communication, Phenomenology (philosophy), Theoretical psychology, Abstraction