A Game Analysis of the Financing Behavior of Enterprise Financing Body
Zhenyu Yang
Abstract
Zhenyu Yang
Abstract
The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises.The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game.The concrete measures are to raise the investors' ability to discriminate the types of fi- nancing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterpri- ses.
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The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises.The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game.The concrete measures are to raise the investors' ability to discriminate the types of fi- nancing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterpri- ses.
Key concepts: Bayesian game, Perfect information, Sequential game, Imperfect, Damages, Complete information, Finance, Nash equilibrium