2007Economic SurveyRequires access

A Game Analysis of the Financing Behavior of Enterprise Financing Body

Zhenyu Yang

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Abstract

The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises.The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game.The concrete measures are to raise the investors' ability to discriminate the types of fi- nancing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterpri- ses.

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What this paper is about

The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises.The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game.The concrete measures are to raise the investors' ability to discriminate the types of fi- nancing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterpri- ses.

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Available abstract

The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises.The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game.The concrete measures are to raise the investors' ability to discriminate the types of fi- nancing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterpri- ses.

Key concepts: Bayesian game, Perfect information, Sequential game, Imperfect, Damages, Complete information, Finance, Nash equilibrium

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