2008•Journal of Shandong UniversityRequires access

Comparison of the Effects of China's Treasury Auction Mechanisms:Uniform-price Auction vs.Hybrid Auction

Zhichao Zhang

Abstract

The Ministry of Finance changed in 2004 the treasury auction mechanism from the uniform-price auction to hybrid auction.In this article,the author used the reduced-form analysis method to compare the effects of uniform-price auction and hybrid auction with data from the Ministry.Our goal is to find out if there is any difference between the two auction mechanisms in terms of bid competition and auction revenue.

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Key concepts: Revenue equivalence, Generalized second-price auction, Vickrey auction, Auction theory, Multiunit auction, Dutch auction, English auction, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction