The Reasonable Choice of Auction Pattern in the Allocation of Public Resources
Ouyang Yan-jia
Abstract
Ouyang Yan-jia
Abstract
This paper adopts the auction theory to point out that the English auction should not always be the best choice in government auctions of the public resources,instead,we should choose a suitable auction pattern under different auction circumstances.The government's objective,the buyer's risk attitude and the auction characteristics of the public resources should be comprehensively considered in the process of the auction options of the government.Particularly,this paper indicates that the second price sealed bid auction enjoys a wide range of application in the auction of the public resources with common value characteristics;the Dutch auction is usually more suitable than the English auction in the auction on the non-performing assets.
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This paper adopts the auction theory to point out that the English auction should not always be the best choice in government auctions of the public resources,instead,we should choose a suitable auction pattern under different auction circumstances.The government's objective,the buyer's risk attitude and the auction characteristics of the public resources should be comprehensively considered in the process of the auction options of the government.Particularly,this paper indicates that the second price sealed bid auction enjoys a wide range of application in the auction of the public resources with common value characteristics;the Dutch auction is usually more suitable than the English auction in the auction on the non-performing assets.
Key concepts: Auction theory, Reverse auction, Revenue equivalence, Vickrey auction, Generalized second-price auction, Dutch auction, Microeconomics, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction