Credit,Hidden Motivation and Knowledge Sharing of Company
Jingfei Wu
Abstract
Jingfei Wu
Abstract
Most of KM research of knowledge sharing is the simple replanting of classical incentive theory.Most of motivation contract is reward motivation.This paper establishes an apparent motivation model with the premise under which private outputs is public information,analyzes the validity of such kind of motivation to codified knowledge sharing.Later,this paper puts forward an apparent motivation model with the premise under which team outputs not being divided among team members is public information,argues that this motivation can't be Pareto optimization.Ultimately,this paper establishes a hidden motivation model with credit existed and proves that hidden contract can inspire sharing motivation efficiently if team members in some extent are patient.As to knowledge workers that pay more attention to their knowledge,hidden contract can inspire sharing motivation efficiently if only they have faint patient.Reasoned ring upon ring,this paper gets the conclusion that hidden contract but not apparent contract such as reward contract is the optimal motivation contract to inspire knowledge sharing.
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Most of KM research of knowledge sharing is the simple replanting of classical incentive theory.Most of motivation contract is reward motivation.This paper establishes an apparent motivation model with the premise under which private outputs is public information,analyzes the validity of such kind of motivation to codified knowledge sharing.Later,this paper puts forward an apparent motivation model with the premise under which team outputs not being divided among team members is public information,argues that this motivation can't be Pareto optimization.Ultimately,this paper establishes a hidden motivation model with credit existed and proves that hidden contract can inspire sharing motivation efficiently if team members in some extent are patient.As to knowledge workers that pay more attention to their knowledge,hidden contract can inspire sharing motivation efficiently if only they have faint patient.Reasoned ring upon ring,this paper gets the conclusion that hidden contract but not apparent contract such as reward contract is the optimal motivation contract to inspire knowledge sharing.
Key concepts: Premise, Incentive, Contract theory, Knowledge sharing, Intrinsic motivation, Knowledge management, Pareto principle, Business