2013Jisuanji gongchengRequires access

Research on Enterprise Information Security Attack-defense Strategic Based on Game Theory

Han Wen-yin

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Abstract

The attack-defense relationship in information security is studied through three game models.The attack and defense equilibrium relationship is discussed with incomplete information dynamic game model,to reach the strategy selection and parameter constraints when the attack and defense relationship getting equilibrium.Taking into account of the long-term and repeatability of the attack and defense relationship,a repeated attack and defense game model under incomplete information is established and long-run equilibrium relationship is reached.Because of the incomplete rationality of decision maker,the limited rationality assumptions is introduced,to verify the validity of the above two models' conclusion,and getting the effective strategies to solve information security problems with the use of replication dynamic solving evolutionarily stable strategy.

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What this paper is about

The attack-defense relationship in information security is studied through three game models.The attack and defense equilibrium relationship is discussed with incomplete information dynamic game model,to reach the strategy selection and parameter constraints when the attack and defense relationship getting equilibrium.Taking into account of the long-term and repeatability of the attack and defense relationship,a repeated attack and defense game model under incomplete information is established and long-run equilibrium relationship is reached.Because of the incomplete rationality of decision maker,the limited rationality assumptions is introduced,to verify the validity of the above two models' conclusion,and getting the effective strategies to solve information security problems with the use of replication dynamic solving evolutionarily stable strategy.

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Available abstract

The attack-defense relationship in information security is studied through three game models.The attack and defense equilibrium relationship is discussed with incomplete information dynamic game model,to reach the strategy selection and parameter constraints when the attack and defense relationship getting equilibrium.Taking into account of the long-term and repeatability of the attack and defense relationship,a repeated attack and defense game model under incomplete information is established and long-run equilibrium relationship is reached.Because of the incomplete rationality of decision maker,the limited rationality assumptions is introduced,to verify the validity of the above two models' conclusion,and getting the effective strategies to solve information security problems with the use of replication dynamic solving evolutionarily stable strategy.

Key concepts: Computer science, Rationality, Complete information, Game theory, Selection (genetic algorithm), Computer security, Information security, Strategy

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