Prediction Method of Attack Behavior Based on Stackelberg Security Game
Tianyang Zhou, Xiaoyue Ge, Yichao Zang, Qingxian Wang
Abstract
Tianyang Zhou, Xiaoyue Ge, Yichao Zang, Qingxian Wang
Abstract
The essence of Network attack and Defense confrontation is the Game process between attacker and Defender. In the research of the existing network attack strategy, there is a priori hypothesis defect of equal status between the subjects of the attack and defense game. Threat intelligence cannot be shared between defenders. Game theory is introduced into the process of constructing network defense strategy generation model, and prediction method of attack behavior based on Stackelberg Security Game is proposed. By establishing the network model, the Stackelberg security game strong equilibrium strategy algorithm is used to generate the optimal attack strategy, which not only fully considers the influence of the relationship between the two sides in the attack and defense behavior and shares Information, but also ensures the accuracy of the attack strategy generation. The experimental results show that the proposed model and method are feasible and effective, and can improv the attack effect.
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The essence of Network attack and Defense confrontation is the Game process between attacker and Defender. In the research of the existing network attack strategy, there is a priori hypothesis defect of equal status between the subjects of the attack and defense game. Threat intelligence cannot be shared between defenders. Game theory is introduced into the process of constructing network defense strategy generation model, and prediction method of attack behavior based on Stackelberg Security Game is proposed. By establishing the network model, the Stackelberg security game strong equilibrium strategy algorithm is used to generate the optimal attack strategy, which not only fully considers the influence of the relationship between the two sides in the attack and defense behavior and shares Information, but also ensures the accuracy of the attack strategy generation. The experimental results show that the proposed model and method are feasible and effective, and can improv the attack effect.
Key concepts: Stackelberg competition, Computer science, Game theory, Computer security, Process (computing), Network security, Strategy, Mathematical economics