The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy in the Third World,

Over much of the postwar period of the Third World has constituted the chief area of the East-West competition, and promises to remain so for the foreseeable future. The extraordinary burst of Soviet activism beginning with the October 1973 Middle East war and culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan was responsible, more than any other factor, for American disillusionment with detente and the subsequent broad decline in U.S.-Soviet relations. There is, however, considerable disagreement over the significance of the Soviet behavior and the extent to which it affects American security. The argument has been made, particularly in Europe, that the Soviet threat from and to the Third World has been vastly overblown because of the ephemeral nature of Soviet influence and the West's marginal stake in most countries there. Now that we are in the midst of a prolonged succession process during which Third World policy will almost certainly be reevaluated in Moscow, it would be useful to stand back and assess the military dimension of postwar Soviet policy in the Third World and its contemporary implications. Specifically, this article will attempt to answer three related questions: first, to what degree have military considerations been a driving force behind Soviet gains there to date; and third, to what extent have the Soviets been pursuing a systematic strategy, particularly in the past decade.