Managing U.S.—Soviet relations
John D. Scanlan
Abstract
John D. Scanlan
Abstract
A number of assumptions about the factors that will influence the main lines of Soviet foreign policy for the foreseeable future are shared by many of the leading U.S. scholars of Soviet politics. The introduction to After Brezhnev—Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s, edited by Robert F. Byrnes, stated the basic underlying assumption clearly and succinctly: All of us agree that there is no likelihood whatsoever that the Soviet Union will become a political democracy or that it will collapse in the foreseeable future, and very little likelihood that it will become a congenial, peaceful member of the international community for as far ahead as one can see. In other words, it does not seem realistic to expect significant systemic change in the Soviet Union or substantial moderation of Soviet international behavior anytime soon. Our current perceptions of the factors underlying Soviet international behavior are likely to remain valid for at least the remainder of this decade. Probably the most significant factor influencing Soviet foreign policy at the present time is Soviet confidence in having achieved the status of a global power. It has the military prowess to challenge the United States virtually anywhere in the world where it sees an attractive opportunity to extend its presence or influence. In general and across the board, virtually every element of the Soviet military has been relentlessly and qualitatively improved. More important, there have been two key developments which have emboldened the Soviets to employ their sharply increased military power to political advantage. The first was the Soviet consciousness
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A number of assumptions about the factors that will influence the main lines of Soviet foreign policy for the foreseeable future are shared by many of the leading U.S. scholars of Soviet politics. The introduction to After Brezhnev—Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s, edited by Robert F. Byrnes, stated the basic underlying assumption clearly and succinctly: All of us agree that there is no likelihood whatsoever that the Soviet Union will become a political democracy or that it will collapse in the foreseeable future, and very little likelihood that it will become a congenial, peaceful member of the international community for as far ahead as one can see. In other words, it does not seem realistic to expect significant systemic change in the Soviet Union or substantial moderation of Soviet international behavior anytime soon. Our current perceptions of the factors underlying Soviet international behavior are likely to remain valid for at least the remainder of this decade. Probably the most significant factor influencing Soviet foreign policy at the present time is Soviet confidence in having achieved the status of a global power. It has the military prowess to challenge the United States virtually anywhere in the world where it sees an attractive opportunity to extend its presence or influence. In general and across the board, virtually every element of the Soviet military has been relentlessly and qualitatively improved. More important, there have been two key developments which have emboldened the Soviets to employ their sharply increased military power to political advantage. The first was the Soviet consciousness
Key concepts: Soviet union, Politics, Political science, Foreign policy, Power (physics), Political economy, Democracy, International relations