2010•Journal of Hebei Polytechnic UniversityRequires access

Research on Agency Costs of the Market—oriented Indexes on Reward Contract for Firms' Managers

Yu Liu

Abstract

It is necessary to strengthen the firm's reform that building the incentive and restraint mechanism for firms' managers and reducing agency costs effectively,avoiding agency risks.This paper applies principal-agent theory models to design as foundation to analyse the factors that reducing the impact of agency costs and of path selection in order to realize Pareto optimum result.It puts forward valuable suggestions on perfecting the incentive and restraint mechanism for firms' managers.

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Key concepts: Incentive, Agency (philosophy), Principal–agent problem, Agency cost, Order (exchange), Principal (computer security), Business, Pareto principle