On deposit insurance system under condition of information asymmetry
Du Sheng
Abstract
Du Sheng
Abstract
Asymmetric information, which is defined that there are differences in knowledge of information for each parties of contract, exists in economic activities extensively. Furthermore, moral hazard and adverse selection are a pair of inevitable outcomes of asymmetric information. Since the deposit insurance system was established in western countries, it had always been disturbed by asymmetric-information. And the deposit insurance system is doubted by the authorities in many countries because of moral hazard and adverse selection.
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Asymmetric information, which is defined that there are differences in knowledge of information for each parties of contract, exists in economic activities extensively. Furthermore, moral hazard and adverse selection are a pair of inevitable outcomes of asymmetric information. Since the deposit insurance system was established in western countries, it had always been disturbed by asymmetric-information. And the deposit insurance system is doubted by the authorities in many countries because of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Key concepts: Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Information asymmetry, Business, Actuarial science, Morale hazard, Deposit insurance, Insurance policy