2010Journal of Southwest Jiaotong UniversityRequires access

Study of Insurance Contractor Considering Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Shang Li-feng

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Abstract

To analyze the complex insurance market under asymmetric information,one model is forwarded,in which the risk types of the insured are labeled as high,medium and low.With adverse selection and moral hazard,the paper has studied several related factors leading to sign the contract.The results indicate that moral hazard and adverse selection can reinforce each other,and that the adjustment of marketing regulatory policy should pay attention to claim management and information disclosure system,and the consumers' fraud movements and rights awareness.

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What this paper is about

To analyze the complex insurance market under asymmetric information,one model is forwarded,in which the risk types of the insured are labeled as high,medium and low.With adverse selection and moral hazard,the paper has studied several related factors leading to sign the contract.The results indicate that moral hazard and adverse selection can reinforce each other,and that the adjustment of marketing regulatory policy should pay attention to claim management and information disclosure system,and the consumers' fraud movements and rights awareness.

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Available abstract

To analyze the complex insurance market under asymmetric information,one model is forwarded,in which the risk types of the insured are labeled as high,medium and low.With adverse selection and moral hazard,the paper has studied several related factors leading to sign the contract.The results indicate that moral hazard and adverse selection can reinforce each other,and that the adjustment of marketing regulatory policy should pay attention to claim management and information disclosure system,and the consumers' fraud movements and rights awareness.

Key concepts: Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Morale hazard, Information asymmetry, Actuarial science, Business, Selection (genetic algorithm), Sign (mathematics)

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