Evolutionary Game Analysis of Competition Strategy Choice of Two Types of Retail Enterprises
Juan Ding
Abstract
Juan Ding
Abstract
The paper analyzes the evolutionary process of behavior of two types of retail enterprises in the same market by using evolutionary game theory.Evolutionary equilibrium characteristics of two types of enterprises′ strategy choice are analyzed according to the replicator equation of two types of enterprises′ competition strategy.And the main parameters′s affect to the enterprises competition strategy choice is also analyzed.The result shows that the enterprises′ comparative strength and the product of two enterprises′ competition cost play an important role in evolution of enterprises′ behavior.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
The paper analyzes the evolutionary process of behavior of two types of retail enterprises in the same market by using evolutionary game theory.Evolutionary equilibrium characteristics of two types of enterprises′ strategy choice are analyzed according to the replicator equation of two types of enterprises′ competition strategy.And the main parameters′s affect to the enterprises competition strategy choice is also analyzed.The result shows that the enterprises′ comparative strength and the product of two enterprises′ competition cost play an important role in evolution of enterprises′ behavior.
Key concepts: Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Evolutionary game theory, Game theory, Microeconomics, Business, Replicator equation, Evolutionarily stable strategy